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Alberti, Vasari, Leonardo, from 
disegno as drawing to disegno as
projective milieu
Jean-Louis Déotte
1 1)  The  main  contribution  of  Rancière’s  aesthetic  (Le  partage  du  sensible,  2000  –  The
Distribution of the Sensible, 2004, Le Destin des images, 2003 – Future of the Image, 2007, Malaise
dans l’esthétique,  2004 ) consists in showing that in and of themselves the arts are not
essential in the sense that each art, during the course of history, has been characterized
in quite different ways. According to him, what gives the arts their properties are the
rhetorical ‘regimes’ in the broad sense of the term (ethical: Plato, representative: Aristotle,
aesthetic:  Flaubert).  These regimes offer a site for social  and political  struggle,  which
divide the “sensible”1, because for political players to come into being they must appear
in a public arena that they configure anew each time according to these sensory regimes.
The arts are therefore implicated in a “struggle for the organization of the sensible” to
use Stiegler’s expression (Colloquium at Cerisy, 2004). 
2 2) But this primacy of rhetoric is itself quite classic, it’s the idea that poetry founded the
fine arts.  Rancière in his combat against the notions of “modernity” and the “avant-
garde”,  in  his  systematic  struggle  against  Lyotard,  who  he  reduces  to  promoting  a
Kantian sublime, must also combat on another front. Indeed he must reject that technical
revolutions could have some influence on the definition of the arts, he would reject the
Benjaminian idea that there have been revolutions of a shared sensibility, revolutions
provoked for example in the 19th century by the “mechanical” arts such as photography
or cinema (Le partage du sensible, The Distribution of the Sensible). Thus the idea that there
have  been  and  will  again  be  cultural  revolutions,  that  arediscontinuities,integral  to
semio-technical revolutions. Significantly in the work of Rancière, Aristotelian mimésis
acts in the background as a principle of continuity for the history of western culture since
the Greeks, enabling an account of classical Greek tragedy, as well as the perspectival
representation theorized by Alberti and Hitchcockian cinema (La fable cinématographique,
2001, Film Fables). Thus there is a paradox in Rancière’s work from which one can start
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afresh, if we take seriously the fact that there is history, a history of the arts, and thus
discontinuities  that  can’t  be  ignored  in  the  history  of  culture  as  Lefort,  Lyotard  or
Kracauer and Benjamin all evoke.
3 3) Discontinuities exist because the arts are “apparatused” (framed – appareillés), from
one epoch to the next, by semio-technical devices that are the conditions for these arts.
But these epochs are quite highly differentiated, configuring the arts as well as their
reception, knowledge as well as the way in which beings appear, inscribing themselves in
much longer temporalities which are surfaces of inscription. It’s currently more or less
possible to distinguish three surfaces of inscription, according to the norms of legitimacy
that are integral to them. These surfaces have successively imposed themselves, which
hasn’t  prevented  them  from  co-existing,  and  enables  them  to  be  superposed,  even
causing conflicts or cosmetic différends to arise. Because each one, which is considered a
fact, finds its legitimisation in being a type of right, according to a norm of legitimacy.
Since the Lyotard of The Differend (1983), it’s possible to isolate three norms of legitimacy,
three important relations to the law, to power and to knowledge.
4 a)  When  the  (savage)  law  is  totally  heteronomous,  external  to  being-together  (être-
ensemble)  and the singularity,  the norm of legitimacy becomes narration, which is its
apparatus (appareil): the narrative, and the privileged surface of inscription is the body,
the human body, a surface of artefacts. For Lefort (Formes de l’histoire, 1978), heteronomy
signifies that in this era of law and therefore of the surface of inscription, society has no
influence  on  the  law which  always  predates  it,  because  it  is  given  by  the  mythical
“forefathers”.  The narrative in general,  and myth in particular,  are the focus of  this
narration that exposes the conditions of how the law is given. The ritual is its literal
application, the law isn’t meantto be commentated upon, but to be applied in its strictest
and most literal sense, until  the Being corresponds point by point to regulated-being
(forced-being?)  (devoir-être).  Now,  it’s  possible  to  characterize  the  “savage”  society
(according to Clastres’ use of the term, La société contre l’Etat, 1974) saying that it is against
the State, but also against self-rule and democracy because the body and arts have always
and  definitively  been  “apparatused”.  A  society  without  promise  and  without  projects
because it repeats its nature which is the Good.
5 b) When the law is revealed (monotheistic religions) or integral to the existential journey
of a sage (Buddha), then it is destined to be commentated upon indefinitely in the margins
of the sacred text. In monotheistic religions, the giving passes by the inscription of the
law of the infinite in a finite book, that for this reason becomes sacred, thus entailing the
need for a mediator (writer or not) through whom the infinite is inscribed in the finite.
This figure of the mediator can be the “son of God”, God in human form. In Christianity
this figure receives a special theologico-political determination, that of the incarnation
and  therefore  of  the  embodiment  (incorporation).  The  embodiment  of  the  law  was
imagined by Saint Paul as “circumcision of the heart”. There is no sphere autonomous
from politics  and  the  arts,  the  community  should  be  incorporated  into  the  body  of
Christwhich in turn must penetrate each believer according to the “theologico-political”
schema of a double inclusion. In monotheistic religions, the need for a mediator entails
witnesses of the mediator who will relate his words and his great acts. It is religions that
have  an  aspect  of  witnessing  (the  Evangels,  etc)  and  therefore  the  interpretation  of
witnessing. The arts (painting, sculpture, architecture, etc.) are the visible side of the
legible sacred text.  The hope is carried by the effective creation of regulated-Being (
devoir-Etre).
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6 c) When the law is said to be autonomous, the society gives its own lawwhose place of
enunciation, which is empty, is ideally situated “among men” (Lefort). It’s the condition
of an indefinite deliberation on the laws that it agrees to adopt. In modern conditions, not
the  ancient  ones  of  deliberation,  representation is  vital  (Crignon on Hobbes,  thesis).
Everything happens as if the separation brought about by the footlights of Italian-style
theatre became the condition of politics and knowledge: a transfer of power took place
from the represented to the representatives, the represented were in the audience and
the representatives on stage. In this framework, the representatives (the politicians, and
in  their  respective  domains,  the  artists  and the  scientists)  have  an  essential  role  in
declaring new laws and therefore constantly reconfiguring being-together. The figure of
the representation that imposes itself gives presence to what wasn’t, or what was only
hollow, didn’t have any substance or proper identity: being-together and singularity. The
city-state of Florence in the 15-16th centuries doesn’t have any substance other than that
accorded a priori by the paintings in perspective of the city and the dome of Santa Maria
del Fiore by Brunelleschi. We must not look for in representation what comes after naked
presence, the presence of a people always already there who would represent themselves
after the fact ideologically and artistically.But,  on  the contrary,  we must look for in
representation, what allows presence, what configures it and thus separates it from itself:
through disassociating from the outset representation and “immediate” presence. The
structure of “presence”, and hollow presence, is thus paradoxically representative. It’s
the  representation  that  makes  presence possible  and  not  the  inverse.  It  involves  a
political and artistic performance each time: the representatives perform being together,
the  representatives  compensate  for  the  drawbacks  of  the  origin  of  being  together
through representation. This representation isn’t necessarily parliamentary, it can be the
existence of a simple spokesperson, of an abstract work. The main thesis, is that the One,
to  exist,  must  be  divided,  must  be  Two,  according  to  very  different  modes.  What
distinguishes the modern public arena from the ancient one,  in fact of  this essential
retro-projection, is the rejection already initiated by the Roman Empire of all political
myths of autochthony as in Athens. The modern citizen is not the son of his Mother-Earth
(for example Athena), no more than he is integrated into the body of Christ. Since the
Italian Renaissance and especially in Florence, the norm of deliberation is integral to the
projective apparatus,  particularly  that  of  perspective.  That’s  the reason why modern
societies,  which are  representative,  have  always  been in  crisis  and thus  recorded in
history. The regulated being having always had the natureof a project.
7 4)  The distinguishable norms:  narration,  revelation,  deliberation and their  respective
surfaces  of  inscription:  the  skin  of  human  bodies  and  artefacts,  the  incarnation  or
embodiment,  scientific  objectification of  bodies,  are integral  to the archi-apparatuses
that become the milieux (“milieu” as both the centre and the environment) for being
together,  préindividuel  milieux (Simondon),  before  the  individualizing  differentiation
into singularity on one side and collective on the other. It’s in this sense that apparatuses
are in the middle (au milieu) of the world. The norm of disclosure was created by different
heterogeneous apparatuses: for Christianity, the oriental Byzantine icon is one example
(Mondzain,  Image,  icône,  économie,  1976),  as  is  the  gothic  miniature  that  epitomizes
medieval  European  painting,  another  example  is  Sunnite  Islam’s  interdiction  of
representation  that  privileges  calligraphy  and  a  geometry  applied  to  architectural
decoration, and for Shiite Islam the figurative painting of suffering bodies, etc. (Lyotard:
Discours, figure, 1971). The norm of deliberation, that objectifies everything on which it is
Alberti, Vasari, Leonardo, from disegno as drawing to disegno as projective m...
Appareil , Articles
3
possible to deliberate, is integral to the projection apparatuses. These are the “symbolic
forms” (term borrowed from Cassirer with some modifications) that create the epoch and
create a destination for the singularity and being together.
8 5)  Many indices  lead us  to  think the era of  the projective and representative archi-
apparatus and therefore historic projective apparatuses of representation (camera obscura
, perspective, museum, photography, cinema, analytical therapy, video, etc.) are quickly
replaced by another era and another world that can be characterized by other terms
(digitalisation of knowledge and archives and thus of memory, the transformation of the
contents  of  knowledge  of  information  acquired  without  Bildung (education),
dematerialization of supports,  simulation and no longer representation,  separation of
temporality in relation tothe cosmos, ubiquity of works, always available here and there,
etc). It is a fact, the “ancient” projective apparatuses are reconfigured and synthesized
according to the characteristics of a new milieu which Lyotard baptized paradoxically
with  the  term  “post-modern”.  It  was  an  obvious  paradox  given  that  it  referred  to
characterizing modernity by its capacity to present important political figures of being
together (a narrative of the emancipation of the people according to the thinkers of the
Enlightenment, from the proletariat as an “universal class” according to Marxism, to an
absolutely unique people according to Nazism, etc.). The constitutive narrative of being
together,  or  the  intrigue (Ricoeur,  Temps  et  récit,  1983  –  Time  and  Narrative),  become
integral to modernity, understood as a narrative of alienation, a loss of identity, followed
by emancipation, a self-reconciliation, that is to say as a text form of the realization of a
project. We know that according to Lyotard, anti-Aristotelian that he was, (for whom the
sensible  is  understood  as  resistance,  irreducible  to  logos,  in  short  an  inverted
Neoplatonism), a collapse of intrigue, without which, it seems, there isn’t any subjective
viewpoint, contributing to liberating the sensible for itself, by a sort of purification where
art  (painting)  has  the  most  important  role(Que  peindre?  1987).  The  discourse  of
emancipation isn’t  possible without the dimension of  the project  and representation,
against which Lyotard wrote numerous texts (from Discours, figure to L’économie libidinale,
1974). In fact, the project perfectly characterises the temporality and the relation to being
in this milieu generated by the perspectival apparatus. Lyotard should have characterized
postmodernism (what he called “immatériaux”) by the end of project and not by the end of
the Great Narratives, those which don’t challenge the sensible.
9 6) It can be said that with the perspectival archi-apparatus, perfectly described by Alberti
when he wants to create rules for the three arts (painting, sculpture, architecture), the
milieu in an initial sense (knowing what supports and is located “before” and “between”
apperception and artistic production, preceding the division between the intelligible and
the sensible, form and matter, being-together and singularity), has entered in an era so
new that we could not have been conscious of it sooner, precisely when the synthesis is
madeaccording to other norms and criteria. The synthesis from which the Renaissance
proceeded has a name: disegno. At first sight, according to Alberti, drawing provides the
foundation  for  the  three  arts,  however  it  was  separated  from  painting  (colour),
emancipated and totally “apparatused” by perspective. In other words, if the apparatuses
are the condition for the arts, then the perspective would have “apparatused” painting,
sculpture and architecture, like it would have done for theatre (Italian-style staging, the
Theatre of Vicenza, Palladio), urban planning (in particular Florence under Lorenzo di
Medici),  privileging  drawing  through  which  it  was  also  presented  (the  treatises  of
perspective). Even so, it would have apparatused knowledge and know-how (from the
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Galilean kinematics to Cartesian geometry, from botany to anatomy (modern sciences),
from stone cutting to geography (Map of Rome by Alberti), from archaeology to knowledge
of  the  literature  of  the  Ancients,  to  politics  (Machiavelli)  and  finally  to  philosophy
(Descartes,  Hobbes),  without  forgetting  the  treatises  on  art  (Trattatistica)).  Thus
paradoxically, it’s an artistic technique that is privileged, disegno, drawing, that would
become an autonomous art when collectors started desperately trying to get their hands
on the sketches of Treatises that were recovered in the Albertina of Vienna. But this
technique constitutes the matrix of knowledge and know-how, their new site,since the
best translation that one can give the terms eidos and form, inherited from the double
Greek tradition dating from Plato and Aristotle, is disegno. As J. Ciaravino demonstrated,
the notions of idea (the famous idea hypostasized by Panofsky: Idea, contribution à l’histoire
du concept de l’ancienne théorie de l’art,  1924), like the notion of Plato’s eidos,  Aristotle’s
form, concept, with all the antonyms and opposites possible (sensible, matter, etc.) are
recovered, absorbed, reconfigured by something that isn’t a concept, because disegno, is
also a technique: an action of thought, the trace of this action, the plan of this action and
final work, that is its archive.
Ciaravino: “Disegno is the spirit, the idea, the intention, the drawing, the project,
the structure, the support,  the sheet of paper, the black of the line, the line on
white, the line alone. It is also the beauty, the quality, la bella maniera, the criteria
of evaluation… It is the sketch, the outline, the rendering, the work itself. It is the
work even before it exists; it is the work that already exists. It is the shadow of the
image that will spread across the surface and the completed image already before
our eyes. It is the transparency of the work that is revealed in all its perfection, the
opacity of emptiness from which it appears. <>
Disegno reaches designing: simply the beauty, the pleasure and the enjoyment that
creates harmony, the perfect harmony between the varied elements of the picture;
on the other hand the validity of the formal structure of the work. As a general
rule, the term disegno, isolated, refers to the foundation of the arts or indeed to the
expression of the idea which is achieved by this means. When the term is followed
by colorito, the two notions being distinguished, the term lends itself to be read as
contour, like a linear frame that establishes the first, but not the ultimate power of
the work. When the term is followed by giudizo, it refers above all to the general
quality  of  the  work,  to  the  capacity  that  only  the  artist  has  to  createan
interpretation of the subject of the work. Disegno alone relates to all aspects of the
arts;  accompanying other  terms and adjectives,  it  designates  expression,  talent,
quality, the different characteristics of the work, also in relation to the reaction of
the viewer.” (Un art paradoxal, La notion de disegno en Italie aux XV-XVIè, p. 160, 2004)
10 Disegno has a unique role, because it is both an artistic technique and cognitive and at the
same time a milieu and epoch (what we will call Humanism, or at least an InitialHumanism)
that constitutes the spine of the new surface of inscription, a role that can be attributed
today to the notion of  information or to that  of  immatériaux so dear to Lyotard.  It’s
possible, furthermore, to hypothesize that it’s because Lyotard introduced in his thesis
Discourse, figure, a long analysis of the epoch of perspective as a “block of writing”, that he
was able to identify by 1985 what was still in limbo: our milieu and our epoch.
11 We must give a holistic sense to it,  we could say that the sense of being was disegno,
because beings, like all activities,  experienced its supremacy. Then Disegno  became an
international destination.
12 7) Disegno would have been the sense of sense, but because it is irreducible to a single
domain of signification and since it is also a practice that doesn’t distinguish between a
drawing and design, between abstract delineation and practical configuration. Designo is
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not only an idea, nor the idea of idea, because it comes from a gesture. It’s not a sign, nor
the sign of sign (in the linguistic sense) in spite of it’s etymology (designare = to designate)
because there is a thickness (graphic and therefore plastic) and thus it is related to the
Lyotardian figural.  Ultimately,  it’s  like  a  contour that  would be  a  colour  (a  hachure
surrounding a figure that is about the light-dark, that forms a shadow, a non-configured
colour according to Leonardo). Thus we must not confuse it with the symbol (which is, of
course, a drawing but with a fixed signification), because as a work of art it is always
being interpreted in new ways. Disegno isn’t univocal. A buon disegno respects the laws of
proportion, it starts with a form, from a totality, but it can also be a fragment, a sketch, a
“future project” as wrote the Romantics of Jena. If, in a certain number of Treatises, there
is opposition to colours, in the work of Leonardo, the patch of colour (macchia) has all the
properties  of  a  disegno since it  functions like  a   support  for  projection for  the artist
lacking inspiration, the patch being this non-form where figures can appear.
13 8) The attempt by Panofsky (Idea,  opus cited) to subsume all  the meanings of disegno
under the notion of Idea (a synthesis of the Platonic eidos and the Aristotelian form) could
not succeed, because it wanted to join what has the nature of the subject with that of the
nature of the object, while remaining immersed in metaphysics. 
14 But at the same time, Panofsky challenged the common idea (which would be taken up
again by Cassirer in his important book on the Renaissance: Individu et cosmos dans la
philosophie de la Renaissance (1927)) of a philosophical supremacy of Neoplatonism (Ficin)
in  making  an  unnecessary  gesture  towards  empiricism.  On the  other  hand,  the  Idea
understood in this manner isn’t reducible to a drawing strictly created after the fact from
a visible thing. Moreover, the opposition subject/object only means something due to the
imposition of the perspectival apparatus onbeing-together and on the singularity, on one
hand, like on things on the other. But Panofsky’s stroke of genius consists of asking the
question of milieu or of the “between” (entre), between subject and object, outside of the
philosophical references inherited from the classics. What helps him here is his excellent
knowledge of Dürer and hisengravings that enable us to see devices of perception in
operation. 
15 It was inevitable that such a reflection on milieu (of the between (entre), and this will be
the second meaning of “milieu”) raises the question of medium, this medium resulting in
subjects like objects, facing each other. In 1927, the articulation (one of the meanings of
the  Greek  word  logos)  between  the  two  entities  will  become  the  phenomenon  of  a
“symbolic form”: perspective. This assignation (still hidden behind the mask of a
philosophy of language) will constitute a genuine epistemological revolution since the
idea  (“universal  judgement”  in  the  text  of  Vasari)  can  only  be  understood  from  a
geometry of proportional triangles.
16 9) Perspective is only “legitimate” because it is “artificial”, geometrical, that is to say not
natural,  because  it  doesn’t  theorize  the  optic,  unlike  the  way  of  producing  Greek
sculpture and architecture. What separates the two “perspectives”, is the decision taken
by  the  Renaissance  (its  essential  invention):  that  the  support  of  disegno should  be
transparent because it involves a plan of projection. It’s from here that the choice of
paper as the preferred material support comes. What we then add (thanks to Lyotard) to
the  “milieu” of the Renaissance, and that doesn’t appear in the long list of meanings of
disegno like “milieu”, is that these drawings can only be inscribed on a plan of projection
that isn’t an opaque screen, that isn’t a support for inscription like the sacred book is or
the “savage” body. What is therefore already very immaterialised and digitalised. That’s
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the reason why Vasari can speak of “universal judgement”, because he knows disegno
doesn’t exist without the plane. Disegno has already fallen under the law of digitalisation,
he knows the famous layout of Rome carried out by Alberti according to alphanumerical
coordinates  (Descriptio  urbis  Romae,  1445-1455  (?)).It’s  only  because  of  this  that  the
drawer’s sketches can be an instrument of knowledge and artistic production.
17 10) The philosophical references coming from Neoplatonism (Ficin) such as alchemy or
astrology  might  have  been  dominant  (Cassirer),  and  constituted  the  “common
philosophy”  of  the  Renaissance,  but  it  doesn’t  change  the  fact  that  they
weren’tcontemporary to the perspectival  apparatus. It  would take Descartes,  or  even
Kant, that is to say two or three centuries later, for philosophy to be contemporaneous
with the apparatus of its epoch. Philosophy always comes after the apparatus because
philosophy exposes the axioms. It is the same today, academic philosophy is totally out of
step with the new digital “milieu”.
18 11) But there is still a distinction to be made: if the  perspective apparatus framed the
epoch (faire epoch), it’s according to the following paradox: there is a historic beginning
and yet it always remains (in the same manner in which there are always believers in
Judaism, Christianity or Islam, just like there are always “savages”), it is obvious for the
projective apparatuses that still coexist. It isn’t the same for the “milieu”. If disegniowas a
milieu, it’s firstly that it was between all the pairs of oppositions (from form to matter,
etc.) and because of this it put them all into circulation and communication: resulting in
its  dissemination.  In  certain  respects,  responding  in  this  way  would  enable  the
articulation of  what  has  never  been and probably  will  be  no  more  (for  example:  to
thinking through drawings). Secondly, this power enabled disegno to constitute a milieu,
but this milieu, like all milieu, is both geographically and historically delimited. Disegno
was the milieu of Florence in the 15th and 16th centuries. Today, it’s a research subject for
art historians, it belongs to this domain of “the last things before the last” as Kracauer
specified in relation to history (History: The Last Things Before the Last, 1969). But history
cannot  be  reduced  to  the  positivism  of  historicism.  A  certain  régime of  ideality
inaugurated  by  disegno  always  endured,  precisely  as  ideality.   This  is  obvious  in  the
European philosophy of  science developed by Husserl  (Krisis).  It  is  perhaps  easier  to
understand  the  articulation  of  the  norm  of  legitimisation  of  “deliberation”  of
“democratic and capitalist” modernity (cf. Lyotard, Le Différend) with the definition of the
surface of inscription in terms of project. It’s possible to return to the distinction between
the “representatives” and the “represented” that we limited to the political sphere and
distinguish it from the sphere of theologico-political incarnation-embodiment, and that
of “savage” heteronomy. Because the project isn’t the interpretation of a revelation, even
if we limit ourselves to drawing (it’s not a gothic miniature), nor the literal inscription an
already  existing  law  (loi  déjà-là).  The  “representatives”  create  a  temporality  of  the
achievement which is a formal conception that must be followed by a material execution
according to the constitutive model in the West for doing architecture. This demonstrates
that the project has a fundamental value (arché) because it structures the future. Since
then, temporality induced by the projective era is that of the achievement of an ideality,
that is to say an idea that opens an ideal (like Kant’s idea of reason), which implies that
the effective achievement is always judged according to the ideal that it won’t be, by
definition,  accomplished.  It’s  the  reason  why,  among  others,  the  Lives of  the  artists
written by Vasari progresses in function of an inadequacy of each work in relation tothe
ideal: one painter follows another according to a progressive temporal vector. Disegno
Alberti, Vasari, Leonardo, from disegno as drawing to disegno as projective m...
Appareil , Articles
7
immediately possesses this authority and legitimacy which is that of an architectural
drawing on a building site: even if in previous epochs architecture was always projective
(we can imagine this was the case for the construction of the pyramids), the project can
not be dissociated from the execution, evolving in relation to the work (this was true of
the construction of cathedrals). This is the reason why architecture, like painting and
sculpture, became the liberal arts, disegno is related to knowledge (of the spirit), thus an
autonomous programme (for example : projects for utopian cities, real war machines –
apparats in the words of G.  Martini – to the radial  structure).  As we know, since the
Renaissance, disegno is accompanied by models, it was almost only that (J. Boulet). The
“political”  representatives  were  thus  model  makers:  practical  thinking  proceeded by
volumes, from where the importance of models in the aesthetico-political avant-gardes of
the beginning of the 20th century comes (from cubism to the Bauhaus of Moholy Nagy
including  Suprematism  to  Nicolas  Schöffer,  etc.).  We  can  even  wonder  if  some
contemporary architecture isn’t basically commemorative, taking the form of full-scale
models (Les Folies by Tschumi in the Parc de la Villette, Frédéric Borel in Menilmontant)?
19 Our political representations were at the base aesthetic: models (which can be collected,
like  at  the FRAC  Centre).  The  “modern”  political  gesture  was  always  that  of
circumscription  and  construction:  the  condition  for  drawing  and  design,  image  and
project, line and intention. But what remains of that today? A programme, in any sense of
the word, isn’t a project, because it is destined to end with its actualisation, which will
never be the case with a project. Of course the alphanumerical programme was one of the
elements of disegno (the famous map of Rome by Alberti), but it finally supplanted it by
imposing  on  the  era  of  “immatériaux”  an  uni-dimensionality  and  a  mono-directional
temporality. Thus representation which scarcely has any meaning, risks giving a “naked
presence”  to  itself,  without  mediations.  Certainly  the  “programme” could have been
conceived beforehand as a declination of the project, its concretisation, a political project
giving  rise  to  a  set  of  measures  that  were  programmed.  But  when  a  genocide  was
programmed in the 20th century (for example, the extermination of the “Jews” of Europe
or the extermination of the Tutsis by the Hutus in Rwanda both followed a plan cleverly
calculated and put into operation), we clearly understand that it’s about something quite
different than a project, even an insane one, because the dimension of the ideality of the
idea has, itself, already, been annihilated. What makes the difference, isn’t the intention
(that exists in every project), it’s the systematisation or instrumentation of reason to adapt
Adorno’s manner of speaking: the nature given must be totally applied, in the smallest
nooks and crannies of reality, there must not be any remains: the Nazis went looking for
the “Jews” in the furthest corners of Europe, as far as Thessalonia. That has nothing to do
with the project of the conquest of a territory, with all the destruction that involves, like
in the case of the “conquest of the West”. It’s enough to read the Worker by Jünger: which
outlines the programme of total mobilisation of a people according to the Type of worker.
But  this  Type  isn’t  a  representation,  it’s  closer  to  what  Porchet  shows  with  social
engineering without limits. I would propose therefore to say that a Type relates to an
ontotypology (Lacoue-Labarthe) and that characterizes post-totalitarian societies. 
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NOTES
1.  The ‘sensible’ does not refer to what shows good sense or judgment but to what is aisthèthon or
capable of being apprehended by the senses. [le partage du sensible = the partition/distribution of
the sensible – refers to the implicit law governing the sensible order that parcels out places and
forms of participation in a common world by first establishing the modes of perception within
which these are inscribed. The distribution of the sensible thus produces a system of self-evident
facts of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well
as what can be said, thought, made, or done.]
ABSTRACTS
It can be said that with the perspectival archi-apparatus, perfectly described by Alberti when he
wants to create rules for the three arts (painting, sculpture, architecture), the milieu in an initial
sense (knowing what supports and is located “before” and “between” apperception and artistic
production, preceding the division between the intelligible and the sensible, form and matter,
being-together  and singularity),  has  entered  in  an  era  so new that  we  could  not  have  been
conscious  of  it  sooner,  precisely  when  the  synthesis  is  madeaccording  to  other  norms  and
criteria. The synthesis from which the Renaissance proceeded has a name: disegno. At first sight,
according  to  Alberti,  drawing  provides  the  foundation  for  the  three  arts,  however  it  was
separated  from  painting  (colour),  emancipated  and  totally  “apparatused”  by  perspective.  In
other words, if the apparatuses are the condition for the arts, then the perspective would have
“apparatused” painting, sculpture and architecture, like it would have done for theatre (Italian-
style staging, the Theatre of Vicenza, Palladio),  urban planning (in particular Florence under
Lorenzo di Medici),  privileging drawing through which it was also presented (the treatises of
perspective).
Au XVè et XVIè siècle en Italie des artistes comme Alberti, Léonard de Vinci, etc,  vont du fait de
l'imposition qui va se généraliser de l'appareil (apparatus) perspectif, redéfinir le dessin dans ses
rapports aux autres arts (peinture, architecture). Le dessin va d'une part devenir le modèle des
arts de l'espace, mais surtout,  sa compréhension, en termes de disegno, va déborder largement
le champ artistique pour influencer la philosophie. Le concept va être défini selon la prérogative
du disegno, la temporalité de l'action va devenir celle du projet, qui n'est pas un programme.
C'est dire que l'ère projective à laquelle nous appartenons toujours en partie s'enracine toujours
dans une sensibilité commune qui nous fait toujours voir dans un dessin, une réalité possible.
INDEX
Mots-clés: appareil, architecture, dessin, disegno, dorsale de la sensibilité, Panofsky, peinture,
perspective, préindividuel, programme, projet, Rancière, Simondon
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